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The Political Psychology of Trickster-Clown:
This paper argues that the fanatical will and power that hypnotised 
people in Eastern Europe during Communism was initiated by the 
activities of a Jungian archetype: the trickster-clown. Furthermore, in 
comparison with this, the paper develops an alternate figure based on 
the work of Max Weber: the charismata. Though both types appear 
among the disturbances of liminal periods, as a response to similar 






















































































































































































I have been severel> attacked by critics 
for my ideas o f archetypes. I admit at once 
that it is a controversial idea and more than a 
little perplexing. But I have always 
wondered what sort o f idea my critics would 
have used to characterize the empirical 
material in question.
- C. G. Jung
1. Prelimenarv remarks
A proposal to study the links between politics and collective 
psyche is bound to be greeted with reserve. This is due to the 
assumption that collective psyche belongs to psychology or in its 
spiritual contents to religion and not to politics. Such a first 
reaction, is however, mistaken, as it is not possible to separate 
either the collective unconscious1 from politics or rationality from 
religion. In his excellent book, Brian Tierney showed how 
smoothly the religious institutions o f the Middle Ages were 
transformed into modern secular forms, preserving their original 
substantive spirituality. There is also Weber's similar 'description 
without definition' in "Economy and Society" about religion, 
attributing to it the major role in the rationalisation process o f the 
conduct o f life.2
I'The collective unconscious is a reservoir of latent images, usually called 
primordial images by Jung. Primordial means "first" or "original"; therefore 
a primordial image refers to the earliest development of the psyche. Man 
inherits these images from his ancestral past, a past that includes all of his 
human ancestors as well as his prehuman or animal ancestors." Calvin S. Hall 
and Vernon J. Nordby, A Primer o f Jungian Psychology , Mentor Books: New 
York, 1973, p. 39.
-  Brian Tierney, Religion, Law and Che Growth o f Constitutional Thought 
1150-1650 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.; and Max Weber 
about the conduct of life, Economy and Society , Berkeley: University of 




























































































Although it is true that the modern history o f politics is the story 
o f its separation from the irrational unconscious, it is also beyond 
question that the same period witnessed an unprecedented 
increase o f enthusiasm and mobilisation an account o f spiritual 
picture manifestations in the pursuit o f political goals. 
Irrationality was sublimated into the form o f political ideologies 
and mass movements, into the phenomenon o f nationalism that 
still creates such perplexity today, into class struggles, but 
especially into the form o f political revolutions, the most 
characteristic and unique phenomenon o f modern politics,3 and 
into the totalitarianisms o f the 20th century, that have even 
defined themselves as images o f continuous storms and 
hurricanes in the portrayal o f  the idea o f a "permanent 
revolution".
However, anybody proposing to reintegrate politics with religion 
would be treated with just suspicion. The last important theorist 
attempting to do so was Carl Schmitt, and his fate was 
unequivocal.4 All the same, a prior exclusion o f spirituality from 
politics, on the contrary, would preclude the understanding o f 
modern political history and the extent to which it is still with us. 
In light o f this, it is rather surprising that so few attempts have 
been made so far to study political spirituality. This paper 
therefore proposes to rectify this omission by studying its roots.
The point is that spirituality, the vulcanic power o f the 
unconscious, has a direct affinity with knowledge, strength and 
force and with other materialisations o f ideas - it is their source. 
Until now the concern with exactness and concreteness in political 
science has successfully protected it from involvement in this 
elemental quality o f cosmic furor. However, although there can be
3About this, see Jack A. Goldstone,'Ideology, Cultural Framework and the 
Process of Revolution', in Theory and Society 20 (1991), 405-53, and 
Norman Cohn, The Pursuit o f the Millenium , London: Paladin, 1970.
4See: Joseph Bendersky, 'Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich', History o f 




























































































no political movements without spirituality, not many attempts 
have been made to gain a scientific understanding o f its nature.
This neglect is understandable, as spirituality, or the collective 
unconscious is so abstract that lies beyond any possible analytical 
categorisation and thus only mysticism or religion has been able 
to deal with it. However, on the other hand, its manifestations are 
so concrete, vivid and lively, and it can be experienced so strongly 
that political science cannot avoid dealing with it. Thus, while 
political science has never ceased to deal with the high tension, 
even ecstasy o f significant historical moments, it has studied these 
in a matter-of-fact way, notwithstanding that its psychic 
irritability is an allusive, floating phenomenon, lacking 
concreteness or stability. Political revolutions provide a 
particularly clear examples o f how, in spite o f its absurdity, the 
spiritual can become an objectifying force. When living through 
changes, one experiences directly the extraordinary, and it is 
through these events that the political and social world can be 
changed forever. However, the scientific perceptability used to 
describe events after the fact is not suitable to understand, 
explain and capture the volatility o f a psychic power that, even if 
for a short time, has become an effective force in shaping history. 
This spiritual openness is a peculiar state, when people are in a 
sort o f trance, and when individual interest is forgotten or 
cancelled. Under the pressure o f the intensive presence o f a 
cosmic power self-recognition culminates in the feeling o f a 
common - understood as a unified - consciousness. Under the 
influence o f the unconcious, those possessed can be integrated into 
a single configuration, to take up the same identity shell.5
5See in Goebbel's early novel the figure of Michael who goes by chance to a 
political meeting and immediatelly falls under the spell of a sinister-wing 
speaker : "That evening I sit in a big hail with thousand others and see him 
again, hear him who awakened me. Now he stands in the midst of a loyal 
congregation, He seems to have grown in stature. There is so much 
strength in him, and a sea of light gleams from those big blue eyes. I sit 
among others, and it seems as if he is speaking to me quite personally. 
About the blessing of work! Whatever i only felt or guessed at, he puts into 




























































































It is in politics that concreteness encounters absurdity, and thus 
dictators and charismatic leaders are born. Nevertheless, spiritual 
experiences and historical events can also be detached from each 
other, the first being imaginatively and the second historically 
significant, in themselves, none o f them can solve the paradoxical 
unity o f the spiritual and material world. Thus, even though these 
are different realms, they cannot exist independently. Being 
touched by the principle o f vitality means moving into a primal 
situation, into a naked, shattering experience o f change, a brutal 
feeling o f the influence or possession o f the spiritual collective 
unconscious. With its harsh and direct impulses, spiritual power 
transcends the rational and objective world o f science. However, 
since we participate in both modes o f existence, we must be able 
to shift from one context to another and be capable o f answering 
the need for a complimentary relationship between the sacred 
and the profane. Therefore we need some orientation about the 
emergence and development o f this psychic geyser, since only in 
this way is it possible to construct systematic knowledge on the 
repetitive pattern that the outburst o f spiritual power follows in 
the sphere o f politics during the periods o f transition and change 
in social existence.
2. Politics and the renewed common psyche
Political science started with Aristotle's Politics . Its theme was 
the description o f the common life characteristic o f human beings. 
In terms o f facts, it provided nothing particularly new. These 
ways o f  being had existed since time eternal. The new 
phenomenon was that suddenly the self-regulation o f the social
strength filling my soul. Here is young Germany, and those who work in 
the blacksmith's shop of the new Reich. Anvil till now, but hammer before 
long. Here is my place. Around me people 1 never saw and I feel like a child 
as tears well up in my eyes." Joseph Goebbels: Michael: A German Fate 
through the Pages of a Diary, (1929). In: J. M. Ritchie: German Literature 
under National Socialism , New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983, p. 42; 




























































































unit had become problematic. This rendered visible the basic facts 
o f politics, called for a solution and therefore made systematic 
theoretical reflection possible. The link between systematic and 
objective reflection and the chaotic nature o f the times was still 
highly visible in the most important model used by Aristotle, the 
Politeia o f Plato.6
Greek democracy was a practical attempt to resolve the problem 
o f maintaining political life, while the works o f Plato and Aristotle 
were theoretical. The long-lasting solution for political stability, 
however, was provided by the Empire. The same answer was 
repeated with the fall o f the Roman Republic, which took place 
shortly after the completion o f the third major political treatise o f 
Antiquity, the Republic o f Cicero. Since then, and until our age, we 
have been living, in the words o f Eric Voegelin, "in the age o f the 
Empire".7 This solution in the structure o f politics was based on 
the establishment o f a set o f formal, organisational, structural, 
institutional arrangements that, together with the force o f armies 
and laws, maintained the framework o f politically established 
ways o f being.
However, an Empire is not able either to create or recreate a living 
community. It can only postpone a crisis by extending itself out o f 
all proportion, until the final collapse. However, at precisely the 
time when the Roman Empire was being established, and outside 
politics, a new attempt was made to revitalise the bonds between 
human beings. This occured through the emergence o f 
Christianity. From its humble origins in the widespread Empire, it 
eventually took over the institutions o f the Empire after its 
collapse and was thus able to reinvigorate a dying civilisation.8
6See: Aristotle, Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Plato, 
The Republic o f Plato , London: Oxford University Press, 1941.
7 Eric Voegelin: Order and History, Baton Rouge: Luisana State University 
Press, 1974. Vol.4.
8 See: Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture: a study o f 





























































































The fusion o f Christianity and the Roman Empire gave rise to the 
vision o f the "Holy Empire" - a decisive and unifying image o f 
Western politics until 1648, and even beyond.9
At this point, the fundamental issue o f political science reemerged, 
giving rise to the classic works by Machiavelli (a contemporary o f 
Luther's) and Hobbes.10 The question o f the creation o f a common 
way o f life was posed again, in search for an answer to the 
collapse o f a political order that these thinkers had both 
witnessed. However, the solution was now different. It was given 
not by a new religion, but by a new framework based on the 
survival o f the remains o f Christianity.
The unifying idea o f the Church had collapsed, but the spirit o f 
Christianity had penetrated by that time the population o f Europe. 
Therefore, the "new Empires", as these were manifested in the age 
o f absolutism and divine right kingship, were not simple 
imitations o f the Empires o f Antiquity, but could rely upon a 
different feeling: the existence o f sympathy towards fellow human 
beings, extending beyond the small network o f family relations 
and acquaintances. In this way, once the external, formal 
framework o f the absolutist monarchies was consolidated, after 
the collapse o f the Church and the Holy Empire, it was possible to 
build a common way life based on a new field, that o f the 
"economy". It is to this new reality that the neologism "political 
economy" referred, and its correlative would soon be called "civil 
society", whose science would 200 years later be called (with 
another neologism) as "sociology".
The basic idea behind political economy, as Adam Smith realised, 
was that individuals can be allowed to follow their own interests 
only i f  there exists a fundamental feeling o f sympathy between
9See: Quentin Skinner, The Foundation o f  Modem Political Thought , 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
10See: Q. Skinner, R. Tuck, W. Thomas, P. Singer, Great Political Thinkers: 




























































































them.11 This assumption could only have been valid in a "post- 
Christian" political entity - as this is understood to mean that 
Christianity ceased to be a major political actor, but where its 
presence and impact was still strongly felt. Under such conditions, 
the external structural framework o f the "new Empires" could be 
softened into mere legal rules o f the game where the free play o f 
interest, based on the existing sympathy and the other results o f 
the Christian civilising process, could reign supreme. Thus, the 
original question o f Machiavelli and Hobbes concerning the 
creation o f a political body could be declared excessive and 
irrelevant. There was no need to go back to a tabula rasa. The 
collapse o f the medieval world order did not lead back to a 
natural state, but to a state where the result o f the Christian 
civilising process could be taken for granted.
However, this dilemma has reappeared in our age, as Joseph 
Conrad stated it: "The world, the temporal world rests on a few 
very simple ideas; so simple that they must be as old as the hills.
It rests notably, among others, on the idea o f Fidelity."12 Leaving 
aside for the moment the case o f the end o f the 19th century, it 
has appeared with particular strength with the collapse o f 
Communism. Communism destroyed the common way o f life, the 
possibility o f politics in all the countries under its reign. However, 
this destruction is not restricted to the external phenomena o f 
political life, the presence o f political parties, parliamentarism, the 
free press, etc. It has destroyed the very foundations on which 
such modern institutions are based, the fundamental sense o f 
"sympathy" between human beings, the result o f the millenial 
work o f Christianity also. Under such conditions, the old question 
o f politics cannot avoid being posed again.
The very posing o f this question has been all but impossible in 
political science since the times o f Locke, Hume and Adam Smith.
11R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, Adam Smith , London: Croom Helm, 1982.





























































































There are very few tools available to approach it. In this general 
paucity o f approaches, a major political theorist that has gone 
back to the classical question, as shown by Wilhelm Hennis, was 
Max W eber.13 The central concept Weber developed for this 
purpose was charisma, the assimilative and unifying power o f 
spirituality. A study o f this concept can help us to shed new light 
on one o f the major events o f 20th century politics - Communism 
- which even in its name attempted to pose once more the 
problem o f community in politics and the reformulation o f the 
common psyche. Through its analysis, a better understanding will 
be gained o f the explosive though integrative force o f the 
collective unconscious.14
3. Communism as a myth
There is nothing surprising in the claim that Communism was 
spiritually influenced. It had neither a rational beginning, nor a 
rational end. Its emergence cannot be traced by the growth in the 
number o f party members or in the slow adaptation o f party 
politics to the rhythm o f everyday events.15 Before W.W.I. in 
Russia, and W.W.II. in Eastern Europe, Communism was the 
ideology o f an obscure underground sect. After 1989 in Eastern 
Europe, and after 1991 in Russia, it fell into oblivion within 
literally weeks, becoming an obscure chapter in history books. But 
in between, it was the single most influential mass ideology o f our 
age, defining the shape o f the century.
13See: Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction , London:
Allen and Unwin, 1988.
14 From the writings of Max Weber, see especially 'The Pure Types of 
Legitimate Authority’, 'The Sociology of Charismatic Authority', 'Meaning of 
Discipline', 'The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization', 'The 
Prophet', 'The Different Roads to Salvation', and 'Science As a Vocation', all 
collected in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Max Weber on Charisma and Institution 
Building , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
45 On rapid political changes in the first Communist state without the 
background of homogeneous movements, see Richard Sakwa: Soviet Politics 




























































































The elusiveness o f its initial moments until its abrupt dissolution 
is still beyond understanding, and still the most controversial 
problem o f what are called Communist studies.16 Indeed, far all 
the books one examines concerning the disappearance o f 
Communism, there are just as many explanations about the 
unexpected collapse. The various explanations cancel each other 
out.17 One can not justify the rapid and wholesale dissolution o f 
Communism in the area by pointing out the ineffectiveness o f its 
economic management, or the break-up o f the parties under the 
pressure o f economic and political changes, or even the rise o f 
new social forces o f emerging and proposing alternatives.18
The fact that Communism had no identifiable structure and that it 
fell so quickly into oblivion suggests that it was as if everything 
took place in a dream rather than being an experience which was 
actually lived through. It suggests that communism was a myth, a 
theme o f an archetype, a recurrent and repetitive imitation of 
pictures, models and visions which were fixed and imprinted in
16 For some general overviews about the end of Communism, see Ben 
Fawkes, The Rise and Fall o f Communism in Eastern Europe , London: 
Macmillan, 1993, which tries to explain the unusual situation of the 
Communist party having destroyed its own position; Vladimir Tismaneanu, 
Reinventing Politics, New York: The Free Press, 1992, according to which 
the Marxist myth exhausted its power and no social groups remained to 
perpetuate the political rule; Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis (eds) 
Developments in East Europian Politics, London: Macmillan, 1993.
l 7So far there have been very few convincing analyses of the 1989-1991 
collapse. About the crisis and the processes of decline in detail, see Michael 
Waller: The End o f Communist Power Monopoly , Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993., and See, Leslie Holmes: The End o f Communist Power 
, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.
18 About this, see Peter Ferdinand: Communist Regimes in Comparative 





























































































the past.19 Communism existed without any causal determination, 
as its beginning and its end was rooted in myths.20
It is not sufficient to say that Communism was created from the 
war, even though the amount o f suffering, the collapse o f the 
normal structures o f life certainly played crucial role in its 
emergence, as Communism almost always came into being in 
postwar conditions.21 Nor was Communism solely the sour fruit o f 
Soviet oppression, even though the Soviet military presence was 
in most cases an important factor in the Communist take-over. 
The regime nevertheless enjoyed massive popular support from 
its inception. Many o f the changes instigated by the Communist 
party were popular even after its end. Its leaders were loved and 
admired and for long decades the parties survived every kinds o f 
internal and external crisis.22 Still, in spite o f this support, 
Communism never ceased to use semi-legal methods to exert
19 It is not novel idea that Communism can be studied as a myth. See John H. 
Kautsky: Communism and the Politics o f Development. Persistent Mythes 
and Changing Behaviour , New York: Wiley, 1968; Michael Heller: Cogs in 
the Wheel, New York; Knopf, 1988; or Ronald Hill, Communist Politics under 
the Knife , London; Pinter, 1990: "Communism itself has come to be seen as a 
myth to justify rule by communists" p. 207.
20Conceming its enigmatic nature, see Aleksa Djilas: "History, which is a 
mass graveyard of gods that failed, would be hard put to provide another 
case in which the achievement is in such great contrast to the aspiration. 
Not only has communism made human beings unfree and in some cases 
even more unequal than they were before, but it had proved unable to 
provide for the basic needs, let alone the affluence, of the masses. It 
restrains innovation and creativity in science, literature and philosophy, 
and is in permanent opposition to new knowledge. It can not invent new 
technologies, but primarily imitates and replicates them, and after 
acquiring them through theft. Further, communism is incapable of 
creating beauty, be it in an art and architecture or in design and fashion. 
Further still, it is without a sense of humor, for humor presupposes the 
ability to observe oneself from a critical distance." 'Dissent in Yugoslavia', 
in: Vladimir Tismaneanu and Judith Shapiro (eds.) Debates on the future o f 
Communism , London, Macmillan, 1991. p.129.
21See Martin McCauley (ed.) Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949 ,
London: Macmillan, 1977.
22 "Stalin has become a symbol. He is, as it were, the spirit on the lonely 
height, the all-powerful being who watches over everything and whom 
the subject regards as his last refuge." p. 329 Essad-Bey: Stalin: The career 




























































































power, and even legal measures were supported by shrewd and 
cunning illegal tricks.23
Similarly, in searching for the reasons o f the successful defeat o f 
Communism, one cannot find more than a few marginalised 
persons and quasi-intellectuals who formed the opposition and 
who were often more surprised by the events o f 1989 than their 
defeated enemies, the Communists themselves.24 One has to add 
to this the more recent surprises in the Eastern European 
elections, where the former Communists returned everywhere to 
political power with the exception o f the Czech Republic. Instead 
o f a clear-cut causality, one enters a circle o f double entendre o f 
popular support and coercion, official dissidents and maverick 
Communists, "refolutions" (T. G. Ash) and velvet revolutions, 
supported by secret agents from Moscow.
This gives rise to a series o f perplexing scenes in which the 
protagonists really do act and play their roles as if on a stage. So 
the problem is above all how to transfer the flat silhouette o f 
Communist events into genuine experiences. Experience is a value 
and it belongs to whatever actually happened. It is located
2 3 See George Schopflin about Hungary: "The power wielded by the 
communists was exploitied by them on various occasions to their advantage 
whithout any legal sanctions. In 1945, for example, the Budapest National 
Council refused permission for the Christian Democrat-Catholic Party to 
begin functioning, even though this had the permission of the Prime 
Minister, Béla Dalnoki Miklos. ... However, some of the most spectacular 
irregularities were carried out during the 1947 election campaign. The 
Communist struck as many voters whom they suspected of being anti­
communist off the rolls as they could. The result was that something like 
400,000 people, about 10 per cent of the electorate, were disfranchised - 
about 150,000 of them being in Greater Budapest. ... The 'blue ticket' 
operation was launched to give the Communists a substantial number of 
extra votes - blue tickets were absent voter certificates - and they were 
freely issued to communists, who thus voted several times in different 
electoral districts." in Martin McCauley (ed.) Communist Power in Europe 
1944-1949, London: Macmillan, 1977. pp. 107-8.
24On the negligible influence of dissent, see Aleksa Djilas, 'Dissent in 
Yugoslavia and the absence of leading political figure', in Vladimir 




























































































essentially in the memory. But the only concrete reality o f 
Communism that remains now is its seductive confusion which 
escapes any logic or causality.25 Communism continued to destroy 
the composure o f social and political life, mixed it into a caricature 
o f humanism and democracy, blurred the distinction between 
representations and facts, reports and events.
This study will examine what has remained and what still lies 
within the circumference o f events: unconscious images and 
pictures, and their appearance in politics. Communism formulated 
a second reality and so while it was visible it was not observable - 
it was sensed but was never factual. Communism was only 
sensible, just as a dream can be sensed, but appeared without 
experience. However, its second reality was also empirical, as 
embodied in those feeling-qualities which gained their full power 
in mystical perceptions, imaginations and fantasies in the common 
psyche.26 The terror and the Gulags were the spatial and temporal
2 5 Communism as a lack of experiment in will is the main contribution of 
Marcel Mauss: " As the Soviets, or rather the Communist Party, have been 
able to take advantage of and perpetuate this moral isolation of a whole 
nation, as they have, as it were caged it up, without news, without a press, 
without freedom of assembly, as they have been able to avoid the 
elementary oversight of power exercised by public and especially overseas 
opinion; as they have been able to make Russian masses beleive they are 
still at war with rampant reaction and foreign capitalism, even foreign 
countries: as everything which is not the state has been destroyed and the 
state still confronts only soulless and inconsistent mass, for all the reasons 
the Bolshevik 'experiment' does not seem to me to be proceeding in normal 
conditions or developing autonomously, in a nation conscious itself and 
morally and materially healthy....This socialism this 'experiment' lacks the 
essential feature: will. Russia did not will it and does not yet will it, even if 
there is nothing else does will." A Sociological Assesment of Bolsevism, in 
Mike Gane (ed.), A Radical Sociology o f  Durkheim and Mauss, London: 
Routledge, 1992. pp. 183-184.
26See the "second reality" in Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man , Yale 
University Press, 1944. esp. Ch. VII., 'Myth and Religion'; and also Ernst 
Cassirer, The Myth o f  the State , New York: Yale University Press, 1946, 
about the power of its metamorphosis: "Every political action has its special 
ritual. And since, in the totalitarian state, there is no private sphere, 
independent of political life, the whole life of man is suddenly inundated 
by a high tide of new rituals. They are as regular, as rigorous and 
inexorable as those rituals that we find in primitive societies. Every class, 
every sex, and every age has a rite of its own. No one could walk in the 




























































































limits o f Communism. They were short and marginal concerning 
their actual length, but they were the instances through which the 
silhouette figures o f the Communist myth-world began to move 
and act, like the figures o f a mascabal. Eastern Europe still stands 
suspended at this exit-point, where life ends and each soul follows 
a solitary path into nothingness.
In this field o f second reality we need to trust in our ability to 
perceive symbols and to learn to use once more metaphors and 
allegories instead o f clinging to the demands o f rationality. 
Communism, however, was not the only political event in the 20th 
century to be spiritually influenced. Quite the contrary, any 
liminal or chaotic experience throws up the psychic content o f 
fervorous, delirious pictures and imaginations, and only 
afterwards does it calm down into a systematised framework o f 
the so-called order. But Communism was peculiar in that it 
preserved the original hypnotic suggestions. So in the following, a 
short overview is given o f similar threshold experiences in myth 
formations and their effects on the political psyche in the form o f 
archetypes, that shook up existing certainties and offered 
solutions for new order-making.
4. Myth.
Karl Kerenyi (1897-1976), the well-known scholar o f mythology 
who was born in Budapest and died in emigration in Switzerland. 
Lecturing extensively at the C. J. Jung Institute, Zurich and 
publishing works mainly on Greek mythology, he devoted his life 
to the establishment o f a scientific study o f myths, saying that 
"Science herself must throw open the road to mythology that she 




























































































explanations".* 27 Kerenyi claimed that only science in the broadest 
sense, including historical and psychological as well as the cultural 
and anthropological studies o f myths, can help to define our 
contemporary reality.
For Kerenyi, myths do not have a solid structure. They are always 
in movement. They have recurrent patterns, yet they are mobile. 
Myths are always in a state o f transformation. Even though they 
are the embodiments o f psychic impulses, they are never 
experienced, as myths are only subjectiflcations o f concreteness, 
thus they are imaginary.28 Only in the world o f sounds could 
Kerenyi find a place for mythology, in the sense that myths are 
the music and the at the same time the composers o f the melody. 
Stagnation and dynamism are the rhythm o f the world o f illusions, 
which reveal themselves in the shaping o f reality, in accordance 
with its own autonomous pecularity and constitutes the stable 
unity o f one and the same phenomenon.29 Myths are variations of 
meaningful motives and hence are always adequate to their times,
political ritual. And just as in primitive societies the neglect of one of the 
prescribed rites has meant misery and death. Even in young children this 
is not regarded as a mere sin of omission. It becomes a crime against the 
majesty of the leader and the totalitarian state." p. 284.
27See: C. G. Jung and Karl Kerenyi, Introduction to a Science o f Mythology , 
London: Routledge, 1970, p. 2.
28The best analysis I have found so far about the double reality, the first 
that of the experienced and the second that of the imagination is Vilfredo 
Pareto's book on the concrete, objective struggle between elites and the 
subjective phenomenon of myth around of them. See Vilfredo Pareto, The 
Rise and Fall o f the Elites, Salem, NH: Ayer Co, 1986.
29About reality shaping, see again Cassirer's remarks how the German 
myth formation of totalitarianism changed the comprehensibility of its 
language: "If we study our modem political myths and the use that has 
been made of them, to our great suprise, not only a transformation of all 
our ethical values but also a transformation of human speech. The magic 
words takes precedence of the semantic words. If nowadays I happen to 
read a German book, published in these last ten years, not a political but a 
theoretical book, a work dealing with philosphical, historical or economic 
problems - I find to my amazements that I no longer understand the 
German language. New words have been coined; and even the old ones are 
used in a new sense, are now used as magic words that are destinied to 
produce certain effects and to stir up certain emotions. Our ordinary words 
are charged with meanings; but these new-fangled words are charged with 




























































































like a variation on a musical theme.30 Hence myths are a - 
structural, they have no experienced history, no beginning and 
end, only imaginative and floating relevance.
Beyond the musical characteristics o f myths, Kerenyi also 
expressed their picture-like appearance, with the changing 
sensual developments o f the same basic theme. The torrent o f 
mythological pictures that stream outside time is the main topic o f 
Kerenyi's inquiry. However, it is even more relevant that, 
according to Kerenyi, these pictures and musical sounds are 
things, objects themselves, with a definite meaning.31 The next 
step on the discovery o f the objectivity o f myth was made by C. G. 
Jung, the psychiatrist.
However, before going to Jung, there is a further point made by 
Kerenyi that is relevant. So far, it has been emphasized that myths 
are psychic phenomena. However, the pictorial and musical 
aspects o f myths point to an additional view about the source o f 
myths, ie. that they mobilize our primordial background. Myths 
thus lead back to the place where the two spheres, the eternal 
past and the living present, coincide, where images stream from
30Axnong the gr°'" number of cases of this subtle state it is sufficient to 
mention Le Bon's understanding of socialism, according to which 
"Socialism in its present form is a mental state rather than a doctrine. What 
makes it so dangerious is not the, as yet very feeble, changes it has 
produced in the spirit of the populace, but the already very great 
modifications it has wrought in the spirit of the ruling classes" quoted in 
David McLennan, Marxism and Religion , Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987, p. 
461. This statement can be rendered more precise by the distinction 
introduced by Durkheim between socialism and Communism, according to 
which socialism is merely a concern with economic management, while 
Communism Is a fundamentally utopian movement, aiming at a return to an 
original state of purity. Thus, socialism belong to the prophane, while 
Communism to the sacred. See Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon , 
Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1958, pp. 19, 30, 40-3.
3 ijacob Talmon's book on political messianism leads us to the same 
consequences, that the history of political messianism is the state of myth- 
formation, a particular meaning of the frame of mind, which is more than 
the simple sum total of response to actual situations, or the compound of 





























































































their origin, connecting the primieval period with history, from 
the earliest times when simplified, one-sided, absolute principles 
ruled society.32 This statement means that the myth is the mirror 
o f the primordial vision, that in myth is laid out our grounding 
and our primitive state, and where our emotional atmosphere 
which surrounds and envelops us is rooted.33 Because no matter 
how simplistic it is, the myth is already a rationalisation o f basic 
patterns o f feeling.34 This has been studied by C. G. Jung under the 
form o f archetypes.
5. Archetype
Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) dealt with the significance o f the 
infinite varieties o f psychic phenomena in society and history, 
through the influence o f individual personality. Though he was 
neither a sociologist, nor a historian, his interpretation o f 
individuality has the very special quality o f being constructed in 
terms o f a socio-historical perspective. Jung caused a great stir in 
medical and scientific circles, as he made concrete the need to go 
beyond rationalism, recognising the dark hinterland o f the mind 
in the "unconscious", a field o f vital and destructive spiritual 
forces, the underworld o f consciousness. With the concept o f the 
unconscious and its concrétisation in the archetype, Jung 
recognised the presence o f the irrational in contemporary 
existence and started the quest for the archaic elements o f the
32Mosca described the communist formation as a blind, unconscious 
emotional outburst that leads back to a crude, elementary state:
"Collectivism and communism, like all doctrines that are based on the 
passions and the blind faith of the masses, tend to destroy multiplicity of 
political forces. They would coniine all powers to individuals" Gaetano 
Mosca, The Ruling Class , New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939., p. 
292.
33On how a primeval imagination gets its shape and form through fear and 
recognition in the present, see Richard Sennett, Authority , London, Faber 
and Faber, 1980.
34Like the traumatic apocalypse myth, this distressing picture-show has 
had a wide overview from the Ancients to Christians in Norman Cohn, 





























































































modem mind.35 The unconscious is the territory o f the raw, 
instinctual energy that merges in a human being into 
consciousness.36 The primal energy comes up in the form o f 
archetypical symbols, imagination or pictures. The archetype is a 
behaviour pattern, a situation that 'stamps' us.37 It is a 
relationship that must render the collective imagination personal, 
otherwise it does not fulfil its role properly.38 The various 
archetypical situations are perfectly represented in political 
science, mainly in the literature on leadership, which presents the 
different pre-existing pictures that force individuals to act in a 
politically specified and guided way.39
Thus, the archetype revitalises the primordial emotional state, 
which is a prior stage in the evolution o f the myth. Therefore, if 
the question is how the myth o f Communism was formed, what its 
elementary foundation was, or what the basic structural elements 
o f the communist myth systematisation process were, then
3 3See the excellent part of Michels' book on the psychological 
metamorphosis of the leaders towards archaic images, like the desire to 
dominate and guide, the recognition of superiority, and the fulfillment of 
directing spirit. Robert Michels, Political Parties, a Sociological Study o f the 
Oligarchical Tendencies o f Modem Democracy , London: Macmillan, 1962.
36About possible productions, see Pareto: "In regard to derivations, there is 
not a great deal of differerence between the mystery of the Holy Trinity 
and Marx's theory of surplus value: between loathing of the Great Enemy of 
the mankind and loathing of capitalism. In regard to substance, medieval 
theocracy's aim was to get control of the central power, but by no means to 
destroy it; indeed, albeit without deliberate intentions, it promoted the 
central power. Classical socialism also aims at getting control of the central 
power, which it intends to use as to control economic life in its entirety." 
'Reconstruction of central power and intellectual revaluation’ in Vilfredo 
Pareto: Sociological Writing, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966. p. 314.
37See Max Weber, 'The Social Psychology of the World Religions’ , in: Hans 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber , London: Routledge, 1948.
38The most expressive example on the hatred image of Communism so far is 
from the correspondence between Marx and Lassalle: "The thing to do now 
is instill poison wherever possible" in Mosca, The Ruling Class , p. 479.
39For further details in political science, see Bernard M. Bass: Stogdill's 
Handbook of Leadership, New York: The Free Press, 1981. about the 
different types and functions of leadership, and Jean Blondel, World 




























































































Kerenyi's conceptualisation o f myth, like the Jungian concepts o f 
archetype and the collective unconscious, is o f particular help.40
The analysis will start with the concept o f "charisma", in order to 
demonstrate the presence o f the type o f spiritual power to which 
it alludes, the gift o f grace, and w ill then contrast it with a 
radically different, revengeful archetypical figure, the "trickster". 
The opposition o f these archetypes is a peculiar manifestation of 
the imaginative power o f  the unconscious. The two spiritual 
archetypes help the recognition o f each other, as charisma is 
visible only in the mirror o f its opposite, and vice versa. In each 
other's mutual reflections both charisma and the trickster will 
gain a lively picture.
The agents or canalisers o f the activation o f archetypical images 
are a favorite topic o f sciences, although they are not usually 
classified under this label. They have been called charismatic 
persons in Weber's sociology, clowns in anthrophology41, quasi- 
charismatic persons in Lindholm's overview 42, spell-binders in 
political science,43 and special mental disorderers in Jung's 
psychoanalysis.44
To begin with, only numinosity, the spiritual power that 
stimulates the archetypal picture.will be assumed. Visions need 
guiders or magicians — agents who impose their vision on the 
audience and who are able repeat and stabilize the imaginations, 
the pictures emerging from the unconscious. They are reflexivity 
makers, as they are themselves the electric wires o f sensitivities,
40Also we should mention Gaetano Mosca's already cited work on the ruling 
class as a phenomenon that is partly effected by historical causes, but also 
by myths around the objectification of formulated illusions.
43Don Handelman, Models and Mirrors. Towards and Antrophology o f 
Public Events. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
42 Charles Lindholm, Charisma., Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1990.
43Ann Ruth Willner, Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership , New 
York: Yale University Press, 1983.
44C.G.Jung, The Collective Works o f C.G.Jung , Princeton: Princeton 




























































































which also segregates them from the rest o f the society. These 
transformers are unique human beings, as the inspiration o f the 
unconscious leaves its special stamp on them. The blank face, the 
sheer lighting eyes are the specific psychic dispositions 
characteristic o f their appearence, as has been amply described by 
a number o f works about the charismatas,45 totalitarian leaders,46 
mediums,47 clowns and tricksters who also act as agents o f 
spiritual power.48 A rigid mask surrounds the person, who hides 
behind it so as not to disturb the free flow o f unconscious 
stream.49
If the power-canaliser is a politician, then his office is to 
permanently fulfil the role o f power-making. He is recognized and 
acknowledged as a distinct leader with a unique power to release 
and channel energy for the sake o f the common good. If these 
'dry' types are the representatives o f a frivolous, demonic 
dynamism, then they are manifestations o f the archetype o f the 
clown,50 like the fairy-tale figures or Tom Thumb or Stupid Hans, 
and various other folk characters.51 They have a fondness for sly 
jokes and malicious pranks. They have a dual nature, being half­
divine, associated with healing power and intimations o f salvation, 
and half exposed to ridicule and even torture.52 This figure is a 
combination o f primitive brutality and dynamic energy and 
power, and an identification with him gives one the sense o f the 
superhuman or the god-like. His power emerges from a complete 
submission to instinct, from the pain released through the intense 
discomfort o f this submission, from the animosity and hatred
4S Nietzsche noticed the rgidity of the overman, so he claimed that the 
final task of the higher man is to learn how to laugh.
46See the most often cited author: Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f 
Totalitarianism , London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.
47C.G.Jung, On the Psychology and Pathology o f the So-Called Occult 
Phenomena , Vol.l.
48C.G. Jung, On the Psychology o f  the Trickster-Figure , Vol.9./l
49C.G. Jung, The Psychogenesis o f  Mental Disease, Vol. 3.
50Handelman op.cit.





























































































which easily gives rise to brutal solutions o f self-sacrifice. The 
elements o f the unconscious gain their energy and force toward 
their way to consciousness through a continuous self- 
abandonment, hence self-denial indicates the gentle and painless 
slipping back into the pleasurable state o f irresponsibility, the loss 
o f the firmness o f an autonomous existence.53 This blissful state o f 
submission is reached through ceremonies and rituals.
Under the notion o f charisma as a type o f legitimate authority, 
Max Weber introduced another spiritually influenced power- 
formation into political science54 Although he detached the notion 
from its original theological usage, it has never lost its 
transcendental meaning as a divinely inspired grace. Weber was 
especially interested in those moments o f the emergence o f 
spirituality when the belief in regularities, in order and its 
organisational basis are in dissolution. This state o f fermentation 
is also central to the purposes o f this paper, as charisma is an 
authority that is derived not from office, but from the capacity o f 
a particular person to maintain faith in himself as a source o f 
legitimacy and who could capture the imagination and enthusiasm 
of a public, as the source o f revitalisation against ossification. The 
'touch o f supernatural', the possession by spiritual power is a 
specifically innovative, non-routinised force, an exclusive source 
o f authority, connected to a person who asserts his own sense o f 
mission against the demands o f tradition, law and order, an 
irritating innovator who bums in his own flames. The effect o f 
such persons on their social and political environment under "out- 
of-order" conditions is enormous, as in this way they can fulfil
5 3 See the National Socialist state-leader's words as the embodiment of 
collective spirit: "There will be no licence, no free space, in which the 
individual belongs to himself...The day of individual happiness has passed. 
Instead we shall feel a collective happiness. Can there be any greater 
happiness than a National Socialist meeting in which speakers and 
audiance feel as one? It is the happiness of sharing. Only the early 
Christian could have felt it with equal intensity. They, too, sacrificied their 
personal happiness for the higher happiness of the community." J. M. 
Ritchie, German Literature under National Socialism , p.112.




























































































their task o f reordering the social and political framework o f the 
community.
However, this irrational influence is a delicate point in Weber's 
view. While the non-rational irritability due to the endangered 
state o f stability mobilises the unconscious, stimulates energies, 
generates enthusiasm and renews vitality, the events may turn 
out to be quite different from the gift o f grace, the quality o f 
charisma. Spirituality stirs up feelings, beliefs, faith in reforms, in 
nation-building or in the restoration o f Volk, in the resuscitation 
o f order or the serving o f the community, or in any other 
salvation from crisis without giving any charismatic garantee. This 
latter is an extraordinarily effective power emanating from 
supernatural forces, but the relaxation o f social control turns 
attention away from the strengthening o f common bonds toward 
an obscure end. The mobilisation o f the irrationality o f the 
unconscious - the power o f feelings, enthusiasms, zeal and faith - 
is geared towards the creation o f authority that was suspended. 
Whatever the case may be, the enchanter stands in the middle o f 
a storm, whether accepting Weber's concept o f charisma or going 
further in the political psychology. The only fixed meaning in his 
concept is the personal spell o f the extraordinary, the distinctive 
ability to enchant followers by means o f suggestivity. However, it 
is useful at this point to give more details about this personality 
on whom the spiritual content is passing through.
The main point here concerns the magnificent flowering o f 
pictures, just like a series o f video-clips, that come from the 
authentic strength o f the leader, whose possessed sensuality is 
able to "capture” the mind. The different combinations o f images 
that appear on the screen o f events are determined by their 
mobiiiser, by the person who is giving form to the new volitions. 
Returning to Weber, charisma is not the product o f collective 




























































































peculiar character who bears the weight o f spiritual influence. S5 
But greatness is a mystery, it is based more on devoted feelings 
than on sober judgments, thus the understanding o f charisma in 
reality still remains an enigma. 56
Neither fame or success, nor faith, belief, or power exhaust the 
archetypal manifestation of the "gift o f the grace" or charisma in a 
particular person. It is not easy to recognize who has charisma.S7 
The looseness o f the concept has made it into one o f the most 
elusive categories in political science. It has not helped the 
understanding o f charismatic leadership that the combination o f 
traits that enables an individual to induce others to accomplish a 
given task was called hypnotic 'suggestion'. In fact, this has led to 
a number o f approaches trying to explain the political sense o f 
charisma.
These fall into two categories. One focuses on the individual 
characteristics o f certain persons, presumed to have charisma, and 
proposes psychological explanations for these.58 The other puts 
the emphasis on certain political regimes that are supposed to 
give rise to charismatic leaders59. However, neither the 
psychologising theories nor the literature on totalitarianism alone 
could give a proper description o f the spiritual type o f legitimate 
authority, although both make important contributions to the 
topic. In the following, a new approach will be offered, where 
charisma and its counterpart, the trickster as a unconciously 
originated picture-image will be used.
55See also Ann Ruth Willner, Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership 
, New York: Yale University Press, 1983.
56 See Jacob Burchardt: ’The Great Men of History', in Reflections on 
History , Indianapolis: Liberty Classic, 1979.
57See the most criticized use of his conceptof charisma, by Weber where he 
mentioned as a charismatic leader the name of a leader of the communist 
experiment in Bavaria in 1919 Kurt Eisner. See Eisenstadt (ed.). Max Weber 
on Charisma and Institution Building , p, 49.
58 See one of the best of this type: Charles Lindholm, Charisma .
59Juan J. Linz, An Authoritarian regime in Spain, in Erik Allardt and Stein 




























































































Lei us take the example o f one o f these subversive symbolic 
types, the clown and the function that he fulfills. The 
anthropologist Don Handelman gives us a fully-fledged description 
o f this peculiar character. He suggests that, first, there are 
affinities between the clown type and ideas o f process, and, 
second, that these types are opposed to deity figures, though in 
their composition they themselves combine contradictory evil and 
godlike features: they oscillate between poles o f terror and 
righteousness, disorder and order, violence and playfulness. They 
appear during transformative processes, such as rites o f passage 
(Van Gennep), weddings, folk festivals associated with seasonal 
changes, and in other liminal situations, and are therefore able to 
mould the existing context into their own logic.60 They have an 
enormous power to destabilize and dissolving the context and to 
subordinate their audience to their autonomous internal logic o f 
disorder, as this type dissolves all boundaries.
The role o f the clown is to bring people into contact with the 
unconsc ious, to lift them from the solidity o f the mundane to the 
fluidity o f the spiritual, questioning the existing framework o f 
order.61 The trickster type carries the idea o f liminality in itself, 
as it is out o f place on either the mundane or the spiritual side o f 
the existing oruer. Therefore, it is able to make contact with its 
audience through the unconsc ious.62
60 Arnold Van Gennep, The Rites o f  Passage, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1960.
61See as a peculiar experiment of bringing the clown into politics Ralph 
Dahrendorf: "The power of the fool lies in his freedom with respect to the 
hierarchy of the social order, that is he speaks from outside as well as from 
inside it. The fool belongs to the social order and yet does not commit 
himself to it; he can without fear even speak uncomfortable truth about it." 
Ralph Dahrendorf, 'The Intellectual and Society, The Social Function of the 
"Fool" in the Twentieth Century', in Philip Rieff (ed.), On Intellectuals , New 
York: Doubleday, 1969, p. 54.
62 See V. Turner's definition on liminality, Victor Turner, From Ritual to 




























































































However, one should not forget that both Jung and Handelman 
concluded their account with an important caveat. They called 
attention to the fact that these archetypes can be converted. This 
means that, on the one hand, trickster figures can easily transform 
themselves into charismata; or, on the other hand, that their type 
serves as a bridge toward charisma, the pure Candida63 - thus 
clowns or slaves are the reanimators o f the glorius state o f 
consciousness, moving towards the integration o f opposites. 
Therefore the corrosive elements - the destroyers or deformers, 
the embodiments o f  m aleficient power - are also the 
indispensable components o f transformative purification. Hence 
there is an ultimate contact between types: the archetype o f 
perfection, the homogeneus and the deeply stable charisma, and 
the archetype o f the double figure o f the clown are reconciled.
The godlike perfection and the ambivalent, playful figure o f the 
trickster exchange attributes o f type. Handelman has studied the 
performances in which the laughing clowns suddenly became 
serious, the sober Candida enjoyed the escatological tales, and the 
clowns received gifts that signalled the generative union o f order 
and energy. The types interact fully, each becoming more similar 
to the other while retaining its own typification. Perhaps a meta­
type o f fruitful unity emerges in the sacred center to guide this 
conjunction. In any case, the idea o f a vital impulse, o f 'process', is 
bent voluntarily to that o f order, so that each is integrated 
harmoniously with the other.64 The transformation o f the total 
experience o f the unity o f being can only come from repressed 
immoral impulses, from the colour o f sin and misery. It is often 
forgotten that meekness comes from arrogance, peace from 
torture, and that "one step above the sublime makes the
63See C.G.Jung, Alchemical Sudies, Vol 13.
64A similar description of union we should get from alchemical processes. 




























































































ridiculous, and that one step above the ridiculous makes the 
sublime again".65
F.vil demands confession, so without the mirror o f sin the good 
would suffocate in their own dry perfection. If these archetypes 
are activated, then the spiritual outburst brings joy and 
happiness, and all o f its love and merriness makes up for the 
painful inadequacies, infantile emotions and all-consuming drive 
for possession. The easiness o f the finally achieved union with the 
unconscious gives the same sensual ecstasy both for tricksters and 
charismatas.
If these archetypes, or even only one o f them, are activated, then 
their effects depend on the way that consciousness reacts to the 
situation. The projection o f the unconscious, and the manifestation 
o f its power is also inherent in charismatas also. Both tricksters 
and charismatas are impressive in their own way, with projections 
underlying their energetic appearence. There is no doubt that 
communist leaders have never configurated the attributes o f the 
charisma. However, it does not mean automatically that they 
belong to the other type.66 Charisma is one possible archetype in 
the various picture manifestations o f the unconscious, but it exists 
only when in constant contact and interpenetration with the 
clown-trickster type. Just as charismatic unity and reconciliation 
are indispensable without differentiation, dissolution by the 
trickster is also measured by order.
6. Pictures in the myth o f communism
Our study aims to use the concept o f archetype in order to 
interpret Communism as a myth configurated around primordial
65 See Thomas Paine, 'The Age of Reason', in Political Writings , Cambridge 
University Press, 1989.
66 See the strong argument against the charismatic attributes of 
communist leaders in Zbigniew Brezinski, 'The Soviet Political System: 
Transformation or Degeneration', in Zbigniew Brezinski (ed.),Dilemmas o f 




























































































suggestions and visions. In this way Communism can be 
reconstructed even using limited materials, which are themselves 
inherently impulsive imaginations, like political speeches.67 With 
the official Communist discourse, one enters a world from which 
all the wealth o f detail has been removed, which is deprived o f 
naturality and definitiveness, and is rather an emotional complex 
formed under hermetic intimacy. The political talks were those 
small and precisely portioned units o f the self-presentation o f 
Communism that were called for in order to keep listeners up to 
date about the state o f affairs, the events happening behind the 
curtains, where the audience could freely follow the fantasy- 
world o f the speeches, undisturbed by the events outside the 
scene. This paper argues that it is worthwhile investigating the 
representation and imagination o f Communism, analysing the 
words o f its political figures, once confidence was lost in the 
relational concreteness o f this type o f regime. Once the made-up 
reality disappeared around these figures, one is at least able to 
handle the myth around them.
The words o f Communist leaders are usually not taken seriously, 
though they are themselves modes o f thought, they transmit 
pictures and project visions, conjure dreams and manifest 
suggestions, and so they are explicitly suitable for analysis.
One can most easily recognize the transferences and 
transformations from the energy o f the unconscious through 
certain archetypes into a particular product o f  myth in the 
speeches from the time o f the Communist takeover. The dynamics 
and intensity o f the energy depended upon the reconciliability o f 
the images with the archetype and the sensitivity or reflexivity o f 
the audience towards the projection. Thus, in that period, the 
situation was particularly suitable for identification with the
67On imagination as a method for analysing political phenomena see 
Richard Sennett, 'Charismatic De-Legimitation: A Case Study', Theory and 
Society, Summer 1975, Vol. 2. No. 2., where Sennett used Giralomo 




























































































picture through the archetype. If the archetypical picture found 
its spectators - i f  they fitted each other and were mutually 
resonant with each other - then the consequence was a full-scale 
liberation o f sympathy, giving further strength and power to the 
political myth.68 Otherwise the delirious, unintelligible and merely 
suggestive content o f  the unconscious would simply have 
remained where it belonged, in the sphere o f the irrational and 
the shadowy background o f existence. In post-war times, listeners 
were the captives o f this spiritual motion, transforming 
suggestions and insinuations into events as they perceived and 
reacted upon the suggestions. Therefore the Communist leaders 
with their speeches were the "initiators" who called forth the 
archetypal figures, while the audience was the transformer o f the 
communist myth into objectivity.69
68See the culmination of self-recognition in the feeling of communitas in 
the role of Stalin: "To him alone belongs the power in Russia, and he shares 
it with no one, not even with his closest comrade-in-arms. He alone knows 
all that is happenings throughout his vast realm and tells his assistants 
what he thinks necessary. The rest he keeps for himself. This makes him 
indispensable, and the Communists are fully aware that the fall of Stalin 
will involve the fall of the system, if only because there is no one who 
holds the key to the whole of Russia or Stalin does." Essad-Bey, op.cit, p. 377.
69This process is similar for religious formation. For some examples of the 
various identifications of communism with religion, see N. Berdiaev: "If 
communism is opposed to all religions, it is less in the name of the social 
system that it embodies than because it is itself a religion. For it wishes to 
be a religion fit to replace Christianity, it claims to answer the religious 
aspirations of the human sort and give a meaning to life. Communism sees 
itself as universal, it wishes to control all existence and not simply some of 
its aspects", cited by David McLellan: Marxism and Religion , London: 
Macmillan Press, 1987. or J. Monnerot about the communism as a 
"technological messianism” or a "twentieth-century Islam", "communism 
takes the field both as a secular religion and as a universal State; it is 
therefore more comparable to Islam than to the Universal Religion which 
began opposing the Universal State in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, 
and which can be said to have drawn men's hearts away from the State 
itself. Its voracity is extraordinary. As universal State it would abolish all 
the differentiations which keep the world divided into distinct and 
individual units (the most recent unit of this kind is the nation); and as a 
secular religion it canalises discontent, organises and reinforces every 
Impulse that sets men against their native society:, and works 
pertinaciously to aid, abet, and accelerate the self-division and secession of 
part of their own vital force which plunge societies into dissolution and 





























































































Communist speeches aimed at an audience that was initially only 
an indifferent, neutral screen onto which the silhouette-like 
figures o f the speeches were projected. However, by evoking the 
sentiments o f their listeners, the speakers were able to shape 
them according to their own dramatic suggestions and vision. 
Thus, by studying the images conjured up by the speeches, it is 
possible to identify the archetype that pushed members o f the 
audience to build their existence around these archetypical 
suggestions, and to shape their actions in that particular way. It 
was in this way that the trickster/charismatic figure became 
plastic. These archetypes were embodiments o f the autonomous 
power o f the unconscious at the moment in which its power 
appeared on the threshold and touched the listeners.
At this moment, Jung went further, addressing the question o f 
what happens when unconscious power crosses the threshold and 
seizes the personality. The problem o f hypnotic possession is a 
central interest o f political psychology. So the aim is to investigate 
how archetypical motifs appear in political speeches, and in what 
forms o f common vision the objectivisation o f unconscious energy 
takes place in a community. Tracing the paths o f the topography 
o f the underworld is an important task in order to studying the 
successfully impersonification o f the unconscious either as a 
demonic force or a life-maintaning energy. Only the moment o f 
emergence will be treated, when the autonomous power o f the 
dark hinterland took on its shape and form in the Communist 
political speeches: the further developments in the evolution o f 
communism will not be followed, as this rehearsal which lasted 
for forty years was simply an imitative record o f the already 
founded logic o f an infinite dramatic play o f the trickster-clown.70
70About repetitivity in the different national cases, see Ferenc Fejto, A 
History o f People's Democracies , Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. 




























































































In conclusion, it should be emphasised that for Jung the spiritual 
(or the visual, hallucinatory) side o f being is empirical. It is 
generally present in our selves and it is held collectively in 
society. However the essence o f this dynamic and demiurgic force, 
with its amorphous appearence in pictures, could only be 
objectivised into archetypes on the basis o f a reduced intensity o f 
consciousness. This is because the reactivation o f archaic images is 
due to disturbances o f the mind and a loss o f control, and so it is 
usually characteristic o f a war-like existence.71 The reduced 
intensity o f  attention, and passive and humble behaviour is 
characteristic o f post-war societies, which are the main creators o f 
myths, going back to the Iliad.72
7. Conclusion
All situations that call for emotional responses and therefore give 
access to the unconscious are violent, as they break the closed 
gate between the material and the spiritual life.73 Indeed, such 
archetypal figures, like trickster and charismata always appear in 
periods o f disturbance. Of course, disruption and crisis belong to 
the normal turning points o f  life. However, the violent 
interruption o f the unconscious into human affairs is the 
transmission o f the chtonic from the underworld where things do 
not hold together, where only horror is considered as valid, and it
71 Jan Patocka points out with a similar intention that the state of war 
creates a spiritual atmosphere and becomes a spiritual power of 'liberation' 
in the sense of cynical demoralisation, and of the solidarity of the 
shattered: "there is something profoundly and mysteriously positive. It is 
not the attraction of the abyss or the romantic nature of adventure, or even 
some perversion of natural sentiments. The man at the front is gradually 
overcome by a feeling of meaningfulness, althought it is difficult to 
verbalize". 'Wars of the 20th century and the 20th century as war', Telos 
(1977),30:120.
72About the fermantative effect of the lost war on social structures see 
tlemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Ch. 1. 'The Paralysed Society, 1948-1965'.
73This outburst of the unconscious and its violent attack on the prophets 
was called a rape - a sudden unmotivated occurence of torment, leading to 
the suffering of terrible pains and the heavy pressure of heat. See Max 




























































































gives rise to archetypical motifs - the mixture o f  creative and 
destructive elements, a certain amount o f  ambivalent 
enchantment and danger. The assimilation o f the unconscious 
content into different pictures o f archetypes can occur through 
different types o f rationalisation, such as myth, rituals, religion or 
science.
According to Weber, the three forms o f legitimate authority - 
traditional, rational-legal and charismatic - are different types o f 
response to the violence o f the unconscious, three possible types 
o f control or obstacle to its inflation, but only the charismatic has 
an effect on the spirituality. This is the reason why communism 
cannot be easily accommodated in the Weberian conceptual 
scheme: it has never able to step over the shadow o f the 
unconscious, and so it remained a ghost-like state, without any 
historical memory, without the slightest stamp o f concreteness in 
its birth, although it showed fake marks o f the spiritual spell from 
the beginning.
Communism remained on the magical state o f the threshold, 
falling victim  to the pictures and suggestions o f the initial 
archetype. However, this is the main reason why the Communist 
phenomenon maintained its fascination, as it seemed to have been 
existed behind glass on a mysteriously undefined level, where no 
sounds or noises trace the interactions among groups and parties, 
the sight o f  contours is broken and the unforgettable 
awkwardness o f Communism that shocked both its adherents and 
opponents is due to a genuine concern with nonsense given by the 
figure o f the trickster. The growing sense o f dread can be 
systematised in a unique archetypal figure, in the animation o f 
trickster-clown in this nightmare scene. During its whole 
existence, Communism was able to successfully preserve the 
chronic, corrosive dryness in its own original purity, in the 
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